Michigan Law Review
Volume 49

Issue 1

1950

ATTORNEYS AT LAW-SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEYSPROTECTION OF THE ATTORNEY'S RIGHT TO COMPENSATION
G. B. Myers S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons

Recommended Citation
G. B. Myers S.Ed., ATTORNEYS AT LAW-SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEYS-PROTECTION OF THE
ATTORNEY'S RIGHT TO COMPENSATION, 49 MICH. L. REV. 125 (1950).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol49/iss1/9

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1950]

RECENT DECISIONS

125

ArroRNEYs AT LAw-SuBsTITUnoN OF ArroRNEYs-PROTECTION oF THE ATTORNEY'S RrcHT TO CoMPENSAnoN~Plaintiff employed an attorney on a contingent fee basis. After the suit had been begun, but before trial, plaintiff
moved to dismiss and to substitute attorneys so that he might bring the action
in another state. The attorney objected, claiming that the court should secure
him in his right to one-third of the recovery. Plaintiff contended that the attorney was only entitled to the reasonable value of his services. On argument to
the court, held, for plaintiff. When the employment is upon a contingent fee
basis the attorney discharged without cause has a right only to the reasonable
value of his services. The opinion did not discuss means for protecting this right.
Casebolt v. Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., (D.C. Minn. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 915.
There is no doubt that, because of the personal relationship involved, a client
may discharge an attorney with or without cause at any stage in the proceedings
unless the attorney holds a power coupled with an interest. 1 There is also no
doubt of the attorney's right to recover compensation for the services rendered
before the discharge.2 When a retainer fee is specified the recovery is generally
the contract price,3 but there is much dispute as to the measure of recovery when
a contingent fee is involved. 4 The principal case states the law of Minnesota
which limits the attorney to the reasonable value of his services already rendered, 5 but leaves untouched the interesting question of how this right will be

1 MacPherson v. Rorison, I Doug. 217, 99 Eng. Rep. 142 (1779); The Flush,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1921) 277 F. (2d) 25; I.THORNTON, AnoRNEYS .AT LAw §143 (1914). See
also 124 A.LR. 719 (1940). This right is now in many cases statutory. For example see
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1949) §284. For consideration of power coupled with an
interest see De Garmo v. Shenberg, (Cal. 1940) 102 P. (2d) 522. See also 97 A.L.R.
923 (1935). Generally, substitution is allowed only by court order. United States v.
McMultry, (D.C. N.Y. 1927) 24 F. (2d) 145.
2 United States v~ McMultry, supra note I; Doggett v. Deauville Corp., (C.C.A. 5th,
1945) 148 F. (2d) 881.
.
8 Carey v. Town of Gulfport, 140 Fla. 40, 191 S. 45 (1939).
4 30 YALE L J. 514 (1921); 136 A.LR. 231 (1942) and cases cited therein; Matter
of Lydig's Will, 262 N.Y. 408, 187 N.E. 298 (1933).
5Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281, 176 N.W. 989 (1920); Krippner v. Matz, 205
Minn. 497, 287 N.W. 19 (1939).
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protected. The ordinary case of substitution leaves the court, granting the substitution, in control of future proceedings so that conditions of security can be
enforced with ease. 6 In the principal case, however, plaintiff is about to leave
the jurisdiction taking his cause of action with him. Certainly the charging lien
of the attorney which has been held to attach to the proceeds of the action even
after substitution will be of little value when a judgment is secured in the second
state, Texas. 7 The retaining lien is equally worthless for it is generally held that
the papers held by the attorney must be surrendered if needed by the client for
further litigation. 8 Two rather obvious possibilities remain. The order of dismissal and substitution can be conditioned upon present payment for the services.9 This would represent the most effective protection for the attorney, and,
though this procedure is generally unavailable,10 in special circumstances such
as these it would seem natural to allow it. Equally available should be a condition requiring the plaintiff to give bond securing the substitution.11 Either device
should give the desired protection in these unusual circumstances.

G. B. Myers, S.Ed.

6 See cases cited supra notes 1, 2,
7 The attorney, of course, could

3, 4 and 5.
go to Texas and sue on the Minnesota judgment
establishing the amount of the lien. CoNI'LICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT §§ 433, 434
(1934): Unless the amount owing was quite large, this would be an impractical procedure.
The charging lien has been held to attach to the proceeds of suit after substitution. Bloom
v. Irving Trust Co., 152 Misc. 50, 272 N.Y.S. 637 (1934). .
8 A retaining lien was preserved in Matter of Weitling, 266 N.Y. 184, 194 N.E. 401
(1935). See also Matter of Dunn, 205 N.Y. 398, 98 N.E. 914 (1912). In Robinson v.
Rogers, 237 N.Y. 467, 143 N.E. 647 (1924) the court made the attorney surrender the
papers upon being secured by a bond. But see The Flush, supra note 1.
. 9 This was allowed in special circumstances in Carey v. Town of Gulfport, supra note
3, and Kellogg v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 229 Mich. 150, 200 N.W. 976 (1924).
10 Bernstein v. Suchoff, 242 App. Div. 784, 274 N.Y.S. 586 (1934). But see John
Griffiths & Son Co. v. United States, (C.C.A. 7th, 1934) 72 F. (2d) 466.
11 As in Robinson v. Rodgers, supra note 8.

